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Introduction
After Emancipation separation of the races in schools
became a vital public issue because it was believed that edu-
cation had the potential to destroy white supremacy and equal-
ize the races. Yet, under the Fourteenth Amendment, blacks
were guaranteed equal protection of the law. The conflict be-
tween the white public's concern for the status quo and the
constitutional rights of blacks was neutralized but not resolved
by judicial decision. The law encouraged the development of
the black school as an answer to the state's responsibility to
blacks and the public's desire to segregate the races. As the
status of blacks improved and their constitutional rights given
greater recognition, the dual function of the black school came
under severe criticism. Throughout its history, the role of
the black school in racial politics created more concern than
its educative services. This study discusses the use and the
misuse of the black school by the races since the turn of the
century. It examines the persistent public policy concern which
established the black school under segregation and dismantled it
under desegregation. It records the evolution of judicial de-
cisions which gave increased support to the black American's
claim for equal educational opportunity while maintaining and
protecting the public's interest in white dominance.
To illustrate the effect of law and public policy on the
black school and the misuse of desegregation to destroy effective
schools with a black majority, a case study approach is used.
Lincoln Institute was a black boarding high school in Kentucky
which evolved directly from a landmark Supreme Court decision
on segregation. It was one of the best secondary schools in
the state; its history indicates the fate of a successful maj-
ority black school under current desegregation policy. The study
discusses the failure of desegregation to offer effective remed-
ies which guarantee educational equity for black students. Cur-
rent desegregation policy evaluates all majority black schools,
whether public or private, secondary or college, by the negative
connotations of the black school's original function. The paper
indicates the reasons behind-the presumption against majority
black schools and suggests that the present dismantling of these
schools is a continuation of rather than a remedy to past racist
policies.
CHAPTER I
THE RISE OF THE BLACK SCHOOL UNDER LEGAL SEGREGATION'
The practice of segregation began before the Civil War,
but it was not until the late nineteenth century that the
states began to formally segregate the races. Confederate
politicians were largely responsible for the disenfranchise.-
ment of Negroes. They incorporated apartheid laws into their
violent political campaigns and attempted to regain power by
directing the bitterness of the white electorate toward the
newly freed slaves. Jim Crow laws forbidding association of
the races were common in most southern states by 1875. With
the re-election of many Confederates in 1876, laws of segre-
gation became firmly entrenched in the political and social
system of the South.
Public policy favored the separation of races in all
organizations which could lead to their amalgamation.
Whites feared that blacks would become equal after Emancipa-
tion. Particularly they feared that social equality would
result in miscegnation. No greaten ;threat to White supremacy
existed than the mixing of white and black blood. The public's
interest in maintaining the status quo by separating the
races was justified on moral grounds. Segregation was said
to be divinely inspired. Said a lawyer of the time, "Amal-
gamation is repugnant to the law of nature ... human author-
ity ought not to compel these widely separate races to inter-
mix." Therefore, "the political department ... deems the
mingling of the blood as being hurtful to the welfare of
society."
Any social situation which did not suggest the superior-
ity of whites and brought the races into close contact was
viewed as a prelude to the evil of mixed breeding. The con-
cern for race purity restricted the association of blacks and
whites in nearly every aspect of life. A southern minister
noted, "It made of our eating and drinking, our buying and
selling...our areas of recreation..our very places of worship
...a matter...of race., 2 .
Legal authority supported the public interest in segre-
gation. Justification for state segregation was found in
judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Amendment required that "no state shall deny to any person
under its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." A
Massachusetts court in 1850 decided that "separate but equal"
schools met the states responsibility to black students.
In Roberts vs. City ofBoston, 5a Mass. (3 cash) 198, the
states power to segregate was upheld on the basis that racial
classification was 'reasonable' according to the public
custom. As long as such distinctions were approved by
current social practice, the law supported segregation.
The "reasonableness" requirement for state segregation
was cited in the first separate but equal case before the
Supreme Court. In Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896), a black man
sought relief from state action upholding a statute segrega-
ting the races in passenger trains. In upholding the state's
power to prohibit the commningling of races the Court said,
"...The case reduces itself to the question whether the
statute of Louisiana is a 'reasonable' regulation...In de-
termining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty
to act with reference to established usages customs and
traditions of the people...and the preservation of public
peace...Gauged by this standard...we cannot say a law which
requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances
is unreasonable.',3
The Court in Plessy took the liberty of inferring what
the 'standard' of times was with respect to race commingling.
After deciding that the public interest supported race se-
gregation, the Court assumed the further responsibility of
allowing public sentiment to act as justification for state
racial classification. The Court argued,
The object of the Fourteenth Amendment
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law
but in the nature of things it could not
have been to abolish distinctions based
on color or to enforce social as dis-
tinguished from political equality.4 (italics added)
The Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
guarantee social equality for the Negro. The only duty of
the states, according to Plessy, was to prove that racial
segregation was 'reasonable'. Thereafter, the Court's in-
terest in segregation cases was limited to establishing the
state's power to segregate. The right of individuals to
equal treatment in separate facilities was ignored by the
law, thereby allowing local educatdrs to define Negro educa-
tion as they desired.
Effect of 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine on Black Schools
The Court's decision in Plessy spurned new interest in
Negro education. For blacks, Plessy promised public support
for Negro institutions. Negro schools, established by
liberals, northern philanthropists, missionaries, and Negroes
themselves, gained broader appeal after the 'separate but
equal' doctrine was legally confirmed. Although blacks
gratefully acknowledged the 'equal' side of this principle,
whites were eager to institutionalize the 'separate' aspect
of the law. "The expense of maintaining a separate system
of schools was high, but not too high for the advocates of
White Supremacy."5 As long as segregation was legal, whites
were willing to establish black schools as formal institutions
designed to educate blacks for a lower social status. The
separate but equal doctrine "had unwittingly taken a goodly
number of the Negroes civil rights out of the realm of legal
contract and placed them within the tolerance of American'
morals. Southern school officials (were) given the liberty
to do for the Negro that which they defined to be right.
The Negro schools lost their protection under the law and
(were) placed under the shelter of a moral system that was
weak," 6 said Allen Bullock.
Southern school officials' betrayal of the equality
implied by Plessy, was evident two years after the decision.
In 1898, the Conference for Education in the South, met to
determine the nature of separate education for blacks. The
conference was the most influential educational force in
the history of the region. It spanned the entire policymaking
realm of southern education. At that conference, said Bullock,
"under the impact of new constitutional interpretations and
limiting statutory laws...racial segregation...provided a
special mold according to which education for Negroes was to
be shaped for almost one hundred years." 7
Thirty-six educators from the North and South met to
discuss the issues of public education for whites and indus-
trial education for blacks. The conferees, including George
Fairchild of Berea College, agreed that while Negro education
was good for the South, it had to be different from white
education. Many southerners felt that Negro education was
not teaching the former slaves to be content with a lower
status and promoted industrial training as the appropriate
curriculum. The educators felt that blacks were moving away
from their natural place as manual laborers and said that
Negroes should emphasize their labor potential to gain accept-
ance in the white world. Negro schools were designed to con-
centrate on the development of industrial arts and socially
acceptable traits of humility and thrift; Negroes were not
to be educated along the areas which could make them poli-
tically and socially equal to whites.
Some northern educators objected to this special educa-
tion approach. Yet they recognized that Negro education would
only be accepted on these limited terms. Southern educators
agreed to support black schools on two conditions. First,
the Negro curriculum had to emphasize industrial training.
Second, in return for the support of black schools, northern
educators had to cooperate with the public education movement
to benefit poor whites. The price of the compromise between
North and South was the quality of the black school.
Educational policy toward Negro schools, like judicial
decisions of the time, responded to the public's interest
in White Supremacy. Black schools gained the support of
white citizens on the basis of their role in separating the
races. Under legal segregation the black school became de-
pendent on the good will of whites rather than the state's
duty to provide equal facilities. To gain a decent education,
"blacks had to court the favor of influential whites by ad-
vocating the kind of education whites wanted Negroes to have or
bootlegging the kind of education Negroes felt their children
must have."8
White public opinion had a tremendous influence on legal
and educational decisions regarding separate schools. Negroes,
however, were influential only to the extent that they accep-
ted the special terms of their education. If they had not
agreed to the industrial training focus, the black school
would not have been established. Blacks compromised their
interest in equality to pursue education in any form. They
believed that education was the only way to insure
their liberty in a society that had suspended all their
political rights.
Some blacks even advocalted the industrial education
approach. The most prominent leader was Booker T. Washington.
He was noted for stating that blacks should not aim for social
equality but concentrate on manual skills and moral behavior.
His philosophy was that social acceptance by whites was less
desirable than economic and physical survival. To the issue
of separate schools for blacks Washington responded, "...as
the colored people usually live together, there will naturally
be a process of separation...leave it simply an administra-
tive question which it really is..." 9
Other blacks agreed that integrated education was not
necessarily important. Yet, there was concern over the
special education focus in black schools. Although they did
not immediately associate the black school with inferiority,
some elements in the community raised doubts about the benefit
of industrial training. Said W.E.B. DuBois,
...if we make technical skills the object of
education we may possess artisans but not
in nature, men. Men we shall have only as
we make manhood the object of the work of
schools...This is the curriculum of Higher
Education... 10
DuBois believed that as long as the curriculum in black
schools was inferior, blacks would not be prepared to be the
social equals of whites. Furthermore, he believed that
blacks had the right to demand equal education. Whether
that education took place in separate schools or mixed schools
was not as important as the quality of education provided
for the Negro. Since black schools were available, DuBois
stated that they had an important role to play in meeting
10
the black man's need for classical education.
Although both DuBois and Washington had supporters in
the black community, Washington's accommodating position was
more feasible at the turn of the century. Blacks had no poli-
tical, social or legal rights and did not have the power
to protest the 'separate but equal' doctrine nor its inter-
pretation by southern educators. Blacks accepted the limita-
tions of special education because they had no other means of
social mobility. They put their faith in the good intentions
of the black and white educators and began to support their
school as an integral part of the community. They gave
nearly forty million dollars in cash for the education of
their children. Yet, the seeds of discontent were plant-
ed in the minds of some people. Though their dissatisfaction
did not germinate for several decades, there were early signs
that their suspicious would be realized. Not long after
Plessy and the decision to create special education the
promise held by 'separate but equal' education was betrayed.
The Berea College Decision
In 1899, the Court was faced with its first school
segregation case. The decision of the Court in Cummings vs.
Board of Education, 175 US528, was an indication that legal
authority would ignore the opportunity to demand standards
of equality in black schools. Negro parents brought action
to require the closing of a white high school in Richmond
County, Georgia until a black school was available. The.
Court stated that closing the white school was not a valid
remedy and ruled against the plaintiffs. In so doing, the
Court ignored the constitutional duty of states to provide
even a separate school for blacks.
The Court was willing, however, to uphold the states
right to segregate the races, even in private schools. In
keeping with the precedent set by Plessy, the Court failed
to consider whether separating the races granted equal pro-
tection to the individual. Instead, in the second school
segregation case, Berea College vs. Kentucky 211US45 (1908),
the Court concentrated on the power of the state to enforce
segregation upon a private corporation. In Berea the Court
sanctioned a law expressly imposing segregation on a volun-
tary place of association, a private school. Berea College
was a landmark case in school segregation cases and the prin-
ciple cause for the establishment of Lincoln Institute.
Berea College in Kentucky was incorporated in 1854 for
the purpose of educating mountain whites and promoting
Christian morals. Its founders were opposed to slavery and
with the aid of the American Missionary Association, taught
blacks and poor whites jointly before and after Emancipation.
The men who supported co-education of the races at
Berea were leaders in the N.egro education movement. The
American Missionary Association was responsible for the
establishment of many Nogro colleges. Reverend George Fair-
child, a delegate to the Conference for Southern Education,
was a leading advocate for academic standards in black schools.
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Not everyone in Kentucky shared Berea's enthusiasm for
Negro education, particularly in an integrated setting. As
legal segregation became more pervasive, co-education of the
races at Berea became a service of local embarrassment.
In 1903, after visiting the college, state representative
Carl Day introduced a bill designed to prohibit integration
at Berea. The 'Day Law' stated,
Sec.l: That it shall be unlawful for any
person, corporation, or association to
maintain or operate any college, school,
or institution where persons of the white
and negro races are both received as pup-
ils for instruction...
Sec.4: Nothing in this act shall be con-
strued to prevent any private school,
college, or institution of learning from
maintaining a separate and distinct branch,
thereof, in a different locality, not less
than twenty-five miles distant, for the
education exclusively of one race or color...ll
The Act passed in the Kentucky assembly in July, 1904,Berea was
found guilty and fined $1,000.
Berea went to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, June
12, 1906, to protest the state's action. In upholding the
right of the state to enforce the 'Day Law', the court
followed the logic established by Plessy.
...The right to separate being clear in
proper cases (public schools, common
carriers, intermarriage) the question re-
maining is whether there is such a differ-
ence between the white and black races
resulting from nature, law, and custom, as
makes it a reasonable ground of separation...12
Claiming the natural separation of races, the Court stated
that racial classification was "not prejudice but simply to
suffer men to follow the law of races established by the
Creator himself."1 3 The power of the state to impose segre-
gation in private schools was upheld because such action
prevented the main evil social intermixture produced. Al-
though the decision focused on the power of the state to
enforce segregation, it found 'unreasonable and oppressive'
the twenty-five mile restriction on teaching both races.
The Court affirmed the right of institutions and individuals
to teach black and white in separate location. Implicit in
this action was the recognition of the 'separtate but equal'
doctrine.
On appeal to the Supreme Court in 1908, Berea again had
its case overturned. The Supreme Court in Berea College vs.
Kentucky, 211US45, affirmed the state court's ruling. The
high Court avoided direct consideration of the 'separate but
equal' principle and focused on Berea as a corporation char-
tered by the State. In stating the right of the state to
amend the school's charter, it cited the lower court's opinion
that "the right to teach white and negro children in a pri-
vate school at the same time and place is not a property
right." Since Berea could not claim rights which were
not approved by the state and the state saw fit to segregate
children in private schools, Berea was forced to obey the
Day Law.
The Berea College case highlighted the pervasiveness
of segregation. The public was willing to accept the state's
power to segregate in public areas, but the invasion of the
private arena raise serious questions. Justice Harlan, in
his dissent on Berea, asked, "Have we become so inoculated
with prejudice of race that an American government...charged
with the protection of all citizens...can make distinctions
in the matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent pur-
poses?"1 4 The New York Evening Post described it as "a
latter day Dred Scott decision." The Philadelphia Inquirer
queried, 'what American would have dreamed that the Supreme
Court would make it illegal to teach colored and white chil-
dren under the same roof." 15
Despite public criticism, the legal community demonstrated
it approval of segregation in private as well as public schools
in the Berea decision. A Harvard Law Review article dis-
missed the concern stating, "...The state's right to pro-
hibit miscegnation is unquestioned, to prohibit joint educa-
tion is not much more of a step."16 "Objections to the
Berea decision were unfair," stated a Central Law Journal
article, "since the concern was for'race purity not pre-
judice. ,17 After Berea, blacks realized that their interest
in equal treatment in schools would not be supported by the
law. Having lost their protection from the Court, black
schools became more vulnerable to the educators' interpreta-
tion of 'separate but equal.' The plan of special education
for black schools threatened to further limit the black
communities bid for social equality. It was clear that the
white public would only accept support for black schools on
terms compatible with the status quo.
15
The Establishment of Lincoln Institute
Legal segregation's effect on the development of black
schools was illustrated by the establishment of Lincoln Insti-
tute as a result of the Berea decision. The Court's ruling
prompted the trustees of Berea to start a school for blacks.
Berea was left to the mountain whites and Lincoln was pro-
posed for blacks. The trustees believed they could raise
money for the black school from northern liberals and white
citizens in the state. Berea's administration was instru-
mental in the generation of public support for N.egro educa-
tion as a part of the public school reform movement. In 1906,
black schools were included in the legislative's aid to pub-
lic schools. Lincoln received the benefit of the new interest
in public education.
The trustees of Berea were proponents of special educa-
tion for blacks. They decided that Lincoln should be a 'Normal
and Industrial' school with a teacher-training component.
Lincoln's graduates would uplift the masses. The decision to
limit Lincoln to special education was not required by the
Berea decision. Yet, the educators felt that this would be
an appropriate curriculum "since...a smattering of education
was likely to ruin the negro making him think he was above
the low grade of labor which was formerly his sphere."
Thus, Lincoln was advertised as a school "in the Booker T.
Washington tradition."1 8
By publicizing Lincoln's special education focus, Berea
gained support from white citizen's in Kentucky and the North.
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Liberal philanthropists were among the first to contribute
to Lincoln. Andrew Carnegie, a leading benefactor of Negro
education, was a member of Berea's board and pledged $200,000.
In 1906, a fund raising campaign was started to match his
pledge. Henry Pickering, the Mathers of Boston, Russell Sage
and General Armstrong's widow made substantial contributions
to the school.
The pledges from the northerns stipulated that the
remaining $50,000 came from Kentuckians. President Frost and
others from Berea went around the state to solicit money.
Frost stressed the benefits of an industrial training school
for blacks. Brochures read, "Want a better servant? Support
Lincoln Institute."1 9 "By teaching Negroes correct morals
and virtues of thrift and humility," Frost said, lincoln would
help reduce the crime rate and put useful workers in the
state." 2 0 This won the support of the Board of Trade. Even-
tually, the Kentucky Board of Education voiced approval of
Lincoln.
In a fund-raising speech to the Ministerial Association,
Frost stressed the paternal duty of whites to provide educa-
tion for blacks,
We take satisfaction in the thrift and
good character of many of our colored
neighbors, but a large portion of them
are in sad need of industrial and moral
training...for the race cannot be expected
as yet to provide adequate parental care...
The colored people miss the training that
some of them received in our best homes...
Both self-interest and neighborly kindness
prompt our aid...21
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He assured white citizens that education at Lincoln would
not make Negroes equal. To the contrary, special education
would maintain the status quo. "This school does not concern
itself with the so-called higher education," said Frost,
"...social separation is a fact and education fixes it all
the more firmly. This is like building a fence around a
gardent which you simply cannot afford to let run wild." 22
By emphasizing the socializing aspect of Lincoln's curriculum
and the perpetuation of the social order, Berea's leader
gained the financial backing of local white citizens and pri-
vate organizations. Lincoln's support was dependent on the
good will of white residents, and the public's approval of
"Negro" education.
Black residents of Kentucky were unable to influence the
character of education at Lincoln in its early development.
Not only were they politically powerless to protest the
Berea decision, but its aftermath, Lincoln was not under
their control. They were openly suspicious of the white
educators at Berea and objected to the industrial training
focus. Raising the objections of DuBois, the editor of the
black weekly asked Lincoln's black supporters "are we forever
tamely submit to the prevailing idea that the negro must be
'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for the more favored
race, or shall we make a plea for the same kind of education
23
every other race enjoys." To this concern, two black
graduates of Berea responded that.local whites would never
allow any form of education for blacks which was not consis-
tent with White Supremacy. Lincoln, they argued would at
least be an opportunity for economic advancement. The black
educators succeeded in winning the support of Bookder T.
Washington for Lincoln. Washington appealed to the black
citizens,
I understand that altogether about 4,000
colored citizens have made pledges for
the establishment of Lincoln. I consider
it a matter of great importance that you
honor your pledges... 24
Black residents, sympathetic to both sides of the argu-
ment, finally yielded to Washington's request. Like blacks
throughout the nation, Kentuckians compromised their desire
for equal treatment for the chance to go to school. They
raised $18,000 for the establishment of Lincoln and placed
their faith in the promise held by education. While the
black community's influence on Lincoln was passive rather
than active, accommodating rather than directive, its support
was necessary. The emotional committment made to Lincoln
by black educators and parents sustained it after white
financial support disappeared. Although Lincoln was econo-
mically tied to the white community, its long-range viability
was dependent on its approval by blacks.
By 1909,$450,000 was raised for Lincoln's establishment.
The original location in Anchorage, Kentucky met strong commu-
nityopposition. Upon relocation to Shellyville, Kentucky,
Lincoln again faced white hostility. A mass meeting was
called by local farmers to protest the schools development.
Their congressman presented a bill (Holland bill, 1910) to
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stop work on the school. The legislature which was responsible
for the 'Day Law', used the establishment of Lincoln as a
concrete example of its power to segregate the races. By
vetoing the Holland bill, the law-makers institutionalized
their policy of segregation in all schools. Lincoln was a
tangible result of the Berea decision and therefore won the
legislature's approval. Under a system of legal segregation,
Lincoln gained the support of Kentucky's law-makers, educators
and residents. The school was incorporated in 1910 and began
operation in 1912.
Early Years at Lincoln
With the support of these interest groups, Lincoln be-
came one of the wealthiest and best-rated schools in the
state. As a school owned and controlled by an independent
board of trustees from Berea, Lincoln attracted large sums
of money. Contributions from within the state and the ample
endowment from Berea made Lincoln the largest of the three
independent black schools in the state. The residents of
Louisville alone gave $100,000. No other independent black
school in Kentucky had an operating budget of $20,000. (Map
1) Lincoln's property value in 1916 was $500,000, higher than
any black private school in the United States with the ex-
ception of Tuskegee. (See Table 1-2) Lincoln owned 450
acres of prime farmland, two lakes, a power plant, tabacco
and corn crops and a dairy herd of 200 cows. Its physical
plant included two dormitories, a dining hall, gymnasium,
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school store, administration and classroom building and homes
for faculty and staff. Although the sizable farm acreage
was designed to facilitate Lincoln's agricultural and in-
dustrial training, it provided a unique campus atmosphere
unmatched by local white high schools.
Besides its financial worth, Lincoln was valued
for its academic quality. It was described as effectively
managed and received an "A" rating from the U.S. Bureau of
Education and the Southern Association for Secondary Schools
and Colleges. Its integrated faculty came mostly from Berea
and the ac-ademic standards were high. Lincoln taught students
from jr. high school to jr. college levels during its early
years. Black and white residents of Kentucky and neighboring
states praised the school's work. The local newspaper record-
ed on July 17, 1913, "The Colored People Value Lincoln Insti-
tute..." The Times-Star of Cincinnatti, Ohio noted,"...
Besides Lincoln Institute of Kentucky the state has not one
well-equipped colored school...These young people (at Lincoln)
are distinctly making good...County superintendents have
asked it to supply all their (colored) schools with is gra-
duates..." (April 13, 1914) The Indiana Jewish Chronicle
also stressed Lincoln's success. "...Lincoln Institute is
a new comer...but is rapidly pushing to the fron as a leader
in educaticnal work for the colored people...it deserves the
support of all." (May 16, 1914)
Lincoln enjoyed the public's full approval for the first
two decades of its operation. However, as its endowment was
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depleted, Lincoln's dependency on private contributions be-
came more apparent. When the Depression occurred the finan-
cial security of Lincoln was seriously threatened. Black
parents could not afford to send their children to a private
school and white residents were unwilling to support Lincoln
from their personal income. By 1935, the student body en-
rollment had dropped considerably. The school was in debt
and Berea refused to assume further responsibility. The
board of trustees voted to close Lincoln that year.
Black schools like Lincoln were established and influ-
enced by four major decisions occurring between the end of
Reconstruction and the Depression. First, the Supreme Court
allowed public sentiment toward race association to influence
its support of state segregation. For the next forty years
the law ignored equality of education in black schools -
under the 'separate but equal' doctrine. Special education
was the second significant idea that shaped the black school.
The law permitted educators to design a curriculum for blacks
which would be acceptable to the white public. The white
citizens support of black schools on the basis of this educa-
tional policy was the third important decision. Not only
did public policy demand the inferiority of black education,
but without the protection of the law, black schools were
financially dependent on the tolerance of white citizens.
The state was relieved of its duty to provide for Negro schools
equally. As a result, the black school's survival was subject
to the whims and pocketbooks of a racist white majority.
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The final factor in the establishment of the black school
was the decision by blacks to accept the limited terms of
their education. By committing themselves to the black
schools, despite its problems, blacks trained a leadership
that could speak out against racial segregation. Powerless
to change the restrictions of their education, blacks trans-
lated the substance of that experience into a social reform
movement.
25
Chapter II
Change in the System of Segregation
The Great Depression had a devastating effect on most
southern black schools. New school construction was stopped,
teachers were laid off and salaries were reduced. Contributions
from northern philanthropists declined sharply and many private
institutions were closed.25 Nevertheless, during the first
half of the twentieth century southern blacks demonstrated a
strong committment to formal education. When Roberts v. City
of Boston (1850) was decided less than 10 percent of black chil-
dren (5-19 years) attended school in the South. By 1908, the
year of the Berea College decision, the number had increased
to 30 percent. In 1930, at the beginning of school desegrega-
tion, nearly 60 percent were in school (Chart 1). Negro lit-
eracy in the region increased 90 percent between 1890 and 1930.
When compared tothe 30 percent increase in literacy for the total
population, the Negroes' desire for education was dramatic
(Chart 2).26
The black community's enthusiasm for school had far-reach-
ing effects. Negro educators gained influence in the adminis-
tration of their schools. By "bootlegging" regular academic
subjects to their students, the educators transformed industrial
training into a useful curriculum. Whites tried to steer the
school back to its intended focus but blacks persisted in teach-
ing the same skills that were taught in white schools. Some
courses in the manual arts were offered--girls learned home
economics and boys learned agriculture--but this was mainly window-
26
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dressing, a way of making favorable impressions on white of-
ficials. 2 7 "Negro education . . . became somewhat a duplica-
tion of white education. . . . It was judged in terms of the
value scale held for Negroes . . . and it symbolized America's
dual system of academic competency . . . nevertheless it was
the stuff out of which revolutions are made." 28
The swelling number of academically qualified persons in
the black community created a discontented professional class.
The black school was forced to train doctors, lawyers, business-
men and clergy to meet the demands of a segregated society. The
development of this group strained the boundaries of the black
world. Increased frustration brought internal leadership to
the community. Educated blacks were particularly cognizant of
the failure of separate schools to create equality. Despite
academic and professional achievement, many blacks were forced
to take menial jobs. Ph.D.'s as well as common laborers had
to sweep floors and sit in the "colored only" section. Besides
the humiliation, , it was apparent that education failed to
yield any substantial political or economic gains. In 1930,
black workers were not allowed equal competition in the labor
force; one-fourth of all black families in southern cities
were on welfare; the black mortality rate was 1 1/2 times that
of -whites; and property and poll tax requirements curtailed the
voting power of blacks. The Negroes' faith in the promise of
education was betrayed by the segregated system.
In particular, the equality implied ' by the "separate but
28
equal" doctrine was denied in the public schools. Blacks were
able to influence the curriculum in separate schools, but they
were still dependent on the financial generosity of whites.
Through economic control, white state school officials were
able to limit the effectiveness of black schools. White children
received almost double the state aid for education. Teachers
in white schools averaged $200 per month compared with $70 per
month for black teachers.30 Some states, including Kentucky,
were not blatantly discriminatory. The per capita expenditure
for blacks was equal to or higher than that for whites. (See
Map 2) However, these states were in the minority and by the
mid-thirties, most black schools were economically deprived.
The frustrations of this era caused a wave of protest from
black intellectuals. Lead by W.E.B. DuBois, black leaders be-
gan a verbal assault on the injustices of segregation. Calling
an end to the humility espoused by Washington, DuBois wrote in
the aftermath of a race riot,
Sit no longer, Lord God, deaf to our prayer
and dumb to our sufferings. Thou too art
white, 0 Lord, a pale, bloodless, heartless
thing?3 1
Ignited by DuBois' scholarly protest, black poets, novelists
and playwrights fired the emotions of black masses. Black news-
papers took on a tone of militancy, and black historians wrote
of the glorious strength and heritage of the race. The Negro
Renaissance fanned the flames of discontent and the black com-
munity resounded with a common voice of resistance. Black protest
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organizations, like the N.A.A.C.P., started to push more vig-
orously for equal rights. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, inspired by DuBois, became the
primary force behind the drive to destroy segregation. The
purpose of the N.A.A.C.P. Was to serve as a legal defense for
black civil rights. Its particular interest was the inequality
of black schools.
Through the work of the N.A.A.C.P., blacks gained a viable
means of addressing themselves to the cause of their grievance.
The action of the Court worked to nullify any protest from blacks
that was not strictly legal. With little economic or political
power, blacks had to depend on the legal channel for relief.
They trusted their legal representative, the N.A.A.C.P., for the
proper interpretation of their complaints. After World War II,
it was the most powerful organization for blacks. Noting the
failure of the"separate but equal" doctrine, blacks returned to
the institution responsible for its enactment. Blacks were
forced, perhaps appropriately, to return to the Court for recog-
nition and a solution to inequality.
Most of the N.A.A.C.P. members were products of black schools.
The black school developed the professionals of the community
and gave birth to its leadership. By equipping black lawyers
with the tools of protest, the black school unwittingly became
an instrument in its own destruction. As black educators strug-
gled to improve the substance of the curriculum, students be-
came more aware of the injustices in the system. Their frustration
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turned on the failure of the "separate" schools to make them
"equal." In time they learned to turn away from majority black
schools and identified separation from whites as the cause of
their suffering. By overcoming the obstacles and limitations
of special education, the black school created a force that
would erode its foundation. The intellectual strength and the
moral committment of its students was both. the glory and demise
of the black school.
The Erosion of Segregation
The internal dissatisfaction of the black community was
the primary force behind the dismantling of state-imposed seg-
regation. By the mid-thirties, world affairs had created a pub-
lic atmosphere that was receptive to the Negro protest. World
War II raised the consciousness of both black and white Ameri-
cans. The public became more understanding of the plight of
blacks as they fought for freedom of minorities abroad. Exported
American ideology contradicted the practice of race hatred at
home. The emergency state and the moral concern of the war made
race discrimination less tolerable. Eleanor Roosevelt observed
publically that blacks could not be expected to fight for Amer-
ica when they were treated so unjustly. 32 Foreign policy demanded
that the discrepancy in domestic policy toward blacks become
minimized.
By the end of the war, the status of blacks had improved
considerably. Black civil rights were recognized by the United
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Nations and the executive branch of government. In 1946,
Harry Truman appointed an interracial committee to study the
problem of civil rights. The same year he appointed another
committee to investigate race discrimination in public higher
education. He promoted integration in the armed services and
public housing. The support of the President in these areas
did a good deal to improve the public's attitude toward blacks.
Besides the executive branch, religious groups continued to
support civil rights. During the mid-century, the American
Friends Service Committee and the American Missionary Associa-
tion set up programs and published papers discussing inter-group
relations.33 The work of the religious groups, the support of
the President, the demands of war, and the rising self-pride
of blacks produced an atmosphere conducive to the struggle for
equality. As the public grew concerned about the rights of
blacks, the legal institution was forced to become more liberal.
In 1934, the American Fund for Public Services granted
the N.A.A.C.P. $10,000 to fight the inequality of public funds
to black schools and race discrimination in public transporta-
tion. With this support the lawyers of the N.A.A.C.P. began
to develop a legal strategy that would attack the credibility
of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Although cases involving
the civil rights of blacks in public accommodation, recreation,
voting and other areas were brought before the Court, the strat-
egy focused on segregated schools. The initial casework centered
on graduate and professional schools. The reasoning was that
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inequity of educational facilities on the highest academic
levels clearly injured the Negro plaintiff's claim for equal
treatment. Few graduate and professional schools existed for
blacks and it was impossible to immediately create separate
schools to comply with the law. In addition, early desegrega-
tion cases primarily involved law schools and it was hoped that
the judges would be sympathetic to the standards of quality
necessary for equal treatment. The small number of students
involved offset the fear of wide public protest. Black lawyers
felt that these circumstances would emphasize the hollow pro-
mise of "separate but equal;" either the remedy would be more
and improved black schools or desegregation. Regardless, the
Court's decision was certain to ameliorate black education.
The first case was Murray v. The University of Maryland
in 1935. Donald Murray was denied admission to the University
Law School because of race. Although the state offered an out-
of-state tuition scholarship, Murray claimed the right to attend
the state-supported law school. The Court found that the tui-
tion scholarship of $200 was inadequate and thereby a violation
of the standard of substantial "equality" guaranteed by the
equal protection clause. It stated that forcing Murray to at-
tend outside the state denied him the advantages of attending
state courts where he intended to practice. Since Maryland
could only offer equal treatment in the state law school, Murray
was allowed to attend.34 In its decision, the Maryland Court
of Appeals made an unprecedented interpretation of the separate
but equal doctrine. Rather than focusing on the power of
states to segregate in schools, the court considered the mea-
sure of equality in separate schools and the proper remedy to
inequality.
By giving meaning to the "equal" requirement of the doc-
trine, the law began to consider intangible factors which created
inequality in segregated schools. The Supreme Court followed
suit in the reexamination of equality under segregation. In
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the high
Court established minimum requirements for equal treatment in
state schools. Similar to the Murray case, Missouri did not
have a black law school but provided out-of-state tuition schol-
arhips. The Negro petitioner filed suit against the University
of Missouri to gain admission to law school. The Court found
that state tuition fees for out-of-state education did not ful-
fill the responsibility to provide equal facilities. It required
the development of equal black law facilities by the next term
or the admission of the Negro to the University of Missouri Law
School. Unfortunately the petitioner, Lloyd Gaines, was never
heard from again. Yet, Gaines was an important case because
the Supreme Court allowed desegregation under the "separate but
equal" doctrine. The majority opinion stated,
furnishing equal facilities in separate
schools is a method the validity of which is
sustained . . . but . . . the admissibility of
laws separating the races . . . rests wholly
upon the equality . . . given to the separated
groups.35
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In Gaines, the N.A.A.C.P. successfully indicated the inequality
of separate treatment for black law students in Missouri. The
willingness of the Supreme Court to consider the problem and
solution to the inequity was an encouraging blow to the segre-
gated system.
In the case of Sipuel v. Board of Education, 332 U.S. 631
(1948) the Court continued its support of desegregation on the
graduate and professional levels. Ada Sipuel, denied admission
to the University of Oklahoma law school, sought relief from
the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the state had the duty
to provide equal treatment at the state school at the same time
as other students. She was admitted in 1949. Following the
decision, Oklahoma amended its segregation statutes to allow
blacks to attend white higher institutions of learning if no
black facility was available. However, the amendment provided
that such instruction would be performed on a segregated basis.
Thus, when G.W. McLaurin was admitted to the University graduate
school, he was required to sit apart from whites in the cafeter-
ia, library, reading room, and classroom. He had to eat at a
different time and was assigned to a seat in the classroom de-
signated for "colored students only." McLaurin protested these
conditions as a violation of his"personal and present right' to
receive equal protection of the laws.
In McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the
Court declared such segregation unconstitutional. "Such restric-
tions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
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discussions . . . and in general to learn his profession.
State-imposed restrictions which support such inequalities can-
not be sustained." 3 6 The decision in McLaurin struck down the
logic used to justify separation of the races in Plessy.
. . . There is a vast difference-a Constitution-
al difference--between restrictions imposed by
the state which prohibit the intellectual com-
mingling of students and the refusal of individ-
uals to commingle where the state presents no
bar. The removal of state restrictions will not
necessarily abate individual . . . choices . . .
but the state will not be depriving appellant of
the opportunity to secure acceptance by fellow
students.37
Unlike Plessy which assumed the absence of state segregation
led to commingling, McLaurin concentrated on the right of the
individual to commingle without state interference. Although
the authority of the state to make racial classifications was
not overturned, the McLaurin decision had far-reaching implica-
tions for the "separate but equal" doctrine.
That same day, the Court's decision in Sweatt v. Painter
virtually ended segregation in public graduate and professional
schools. In 1946, the N.A.A.C.P. lawyers had brought suit to
compel the University of Texas Law School to admit the black
plaintiff, Herman Sweatt. Unlike Maryland, Missouri and Oklahoma,
Texas offerred to establish a black law school. However, the
attorneys for the plaintiff showed that the three-room law school
for blacks was unequal to the state law school. In its support
of the petitioner's admission to the University of Texas, the
Court noted intangible as well as tangible factors of inequality
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in the separate schools.
In terms of number of faculty, variety of
courses, size of student body, library .
the University of Texas is superior .
what is more important . . . [it] possesses
to a far greater degree those qualities [re-
putation of faculty, position and influence
of alumni, prestige, etc.] which make for
greatness in a law school. 38
The Court was sensitive to the problems of education in an iso-
lated black law school. The justices were aware that legal ed-
ucation demanded practical experience in a judicial system that
was predominantly white. Besides the lack of intangible qual-
ities, the Court in Sweatt reasoned that a black school could
not be equalized soon enough to satisfy the plaintiff's immed-
iate need. The "personal and present" right of Sweatt to receive
equal treatment demanded that the remedy not be delayed. The
solution was to desegregate the existing and available white
law school.
The early desegregation cases were significant for several
reasons. First, desegregation on the higher education level
attracted the interest of many private organizations. The sub-
mission of amicus curiae briefs on the behalf of Negro plaintiff
in Sweatt and other discrimination cases indicated an increased
willingness of some citizens to support Negro rights. The United
States Department of Justice, American Civil Liberties Union,
American Federation of Teachers, American Jewish Congress,Nation-
al Bar Association and others were powerful and influential allies
of the black petitioners in these cases. Their support was
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critical in dramatizing the seriousness of the issue and win-
ning public sympathy. Black protest, through legitimate legal
action, gained broader public appeal. As American policy shifted
in favor of Negro rights, the Court was pressured to respond.
Second, legal authority was forced to recognize intangible
features of inequality that existed in the segregated system.
Through force of N.A.A.C.P. strategy and the change in public
opinion, the Court approved desegregation as a proper remedy to
the unequal treatment of blacks in education. These early cases
were important in identifying both the existence and solution
to the problem in separate schools. The Court made a significant
departure from its early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. By deciding in Sweatt that the black law school was un-
able to grant equal protection to black students, the Court em-
phasized the "equality" requirement of separate facilities. Un-
like previous decisions which focused on the power of the state
to separate, the Court of the late 30's and 40's ignored the
"reasonableness" of segregation and demanded that the standards
of equality be met. The Court shifted to an interest in the
rights of blacks to receive equal educational opportunities.
When the inequality was established, the Court prescribed inte-
gration as a solution. The new legal approach to segregation
cases was an important result of the early cases.
Third, the higher education cases indicated the limits of
judicial reform. The Court refused to rule on the constitu-
tionality of segregation per se, although this was strongly
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urged by the plaintiffs. The Court justified the action on the
principle of judicial restraint. The broader issues of segre-
gation were not raised by the facts of the cases and the
Court refused to make a ruling beyond those limits. The re-
luctance of the Court to take this action foreshadowed its am-
biguous posture in later desegregation cases.
Fourth, the early cases helped establish the litigation
strategy of the N.A.A.C.P. They were the proving ground for
the larger battle against segregation in all public schools.
The N.A.A.C.P. approach to the inequality of separate schools
began to focus on the inferiority of the black school. After
the favorable rulings on these isolated cases, the N.A.A.C.P.
moved to consolidate segregation cases. By treating several
cases in the context of legal history, the civil rights group
hoped to win a broader reaching decision.
Finally, the early desegregation cases were important be-
cause of their effect on states with segregated schools. Some
states like Virginia, increased their out-of-state tuitions to
blacks. Others, like Missouri and North Carolina, established
or improved their black graduate and professional schools. Mary-
land, Virginia and Arkansas admitted blacks to the state schools.
In 1951 the University of Louisville took over the local black
college. By the mid-fifties most southern states had integrated
their state universities; they were convinced that the Court
had departed from the separate but equal principle in higher
education.
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The remaining fight was the desegregation of elementary
and secondary schools. In an attempt to forestall the struggle,
southern states tried desperately to equalize black schools.
After the early Court cases, unprecedented state aid went to
Negro institutions. As the system of segregation began to erode,
blacks ironically witnessed some equalization of the separate
but equal school system. Lincoln was one of the schools that
received increased state aid as segregation eroded in higher
education. Lincoln suffered after the Depression as a result
of its dependence on private contributions. Just as its finan-
cial situation deteriorated, Lincoln began to attract the inter-
est of the Board of Education. The threat of desegregation en-
couraged the state's support of black schools, particularly
those which were believed to be effective. Lincoln was approved
by both white and black and therefore were incorporated into
the state public school system.
From Private to State Support:
Lincoln's Development from 1935 to 1954
Black educators decided to run Lincoln after Berea withdrew
its sponsorship. Lincoln maintained an independent board of
trustees made up of many Berea people. Still it was a private
school with no source of funds and its future looked dim when
b3 aks took control in 1935. Berea appointed the school's first
and last black president. Under Whitney Young, Sr.'s leadership,
Lincoln survived its financial crisis and developed into a stronger
institution. Young initiated the "Faith Plan" when he assumed
office. Under this agreement, faculty and staff evenly divided
their low salaries. The president and the janitor got the same
wages until Lincoln became financially secure. The school's
debt was paid off by $10,000 left in the will of William Hughes,
a black man from Lexington. Other funds were secured by teachers
who were sent out in the state for both money and students.
Pupils paid a small tuition fee and donated in-kind services to
help maintain Lincoln. The patience and devotion of the faculty
and student body sustained the school after white citizens and
educators abandoned it.
As blacks assumed administrative and faculty positions the
focus of Lincoln changed considerably. Lincoln was never entire-
ly the industrial school planned by Berea; the black teachers
were well-trained in bootlegging classical curriculum. For ex-
ample, when Young returned to Lincoln to teach engineering after
his school days, Berea's board refused to hire him. However,
he found a position waiting two days later when he agreed to
teach janitorial engineering. Despite this limitation, regular
engineering filtered into his classroom material. Under his ad-
ministration, classical academic subjects became the norm.
The residential character of Lincoln facilitated the social
and academic discipline of students. Three hundred students and
fifty adults comprised the "Lincoln Family" living on the campus.
A former student and resident of Lincoln explained how the cam-
pus atmosphere aided pupil performance:
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When students came here, most were from
backward, rural communities with poor
schools. The concern and availability
of teachers here helped students achieve
unexpected academic and professional suc-
cess. Every student found someone older
to relate to. Teachers and other staff
were present around the clock to provide
inspiration and confidence. A boy from
the farm, finding school difficult, might
go to our dairy farm and work with the old
men. Soon they would encourage him to pick
up the books again. People studied, worked,
and lived here for three generations. Many
teachers were former students. Lincoln was
more than a school. It was a community where
people cared for each other. Students felt
secure here and motivated to succeed in life. 39
Black educators and administrators at Lincoln succeeded in
producing one of the best secondary schools in Kentucky. Stu-
dent achievement was highly rated. The teachers and students
developed strong social bonds and the personal interest of the
staff was reflected in their pupils' success.
Although no formal records exist to document Lincoln's
effectiveness, its academic rating, pupil performance, quality
of teachers, evaluation by former students and overall reputa-
tion indicated its success. Lincoln was "A" rated
by the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools
and the Board of Education. The Bureau of Education described
it as effectively managed with a drop-out rate of less than one
percent. All of its teachers had masters degrees and over 900
of its graduates were professionals within the black community.40
More notable former students included the first president of
Lincoln University, a leading civil rights leader and the execu-
tive director of the National Urban League, and the first Negro
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postmistress.* These were regarded as significant achievements
for poor, disenfranchised blacks in the rural South and a tri-
bute to the efficiency of Lincoln.
Many former students felt that Lincoln was responsible
for their professional success. The first black purchasing
agent for the National Aeronautical and Space Administration
wrote, ". . . Had it not been for Lincoln, such may not have
come to pass . . ." Another graduate noted, ". . . Now I'm at
Tuskegee Institute, but it took Lincoln to make a man of me .. 4
Praise for Lincoln's work was given by local educators. The
superintendent of Shelby County Public Schools remarked, "Many
districts besides ours would suffer were not Lincoln not avail-
able to them." The superintendent of Eminence Public Schools
said, "Lincoln should be a model for the state and I think it
is . . ."42 Lincoln was regarded by the public as a truly "sep-
arate but equal" school.
Lincoln turned out many outstanding leaders in the black
community. However, this would not have been possible without
state aid. After trying to exist on self-help methods in 1935,
Lincoln's administration turned to public support. In 1933, the
Kentucky Educational Council had recommended that the Board of
Education support a centrally located school to educate blacks
from sparsely populated areas where no separate facility existed.
Lincoln was anxious to serve this role for the state. To qual-
ify for state aid to independent schools, Lincoln made several
contracts with county and city school systems. Lincoln educated
* Horace Mann Bond, Whitney Young, Jr. and Laura Ray Young,
respectively.
their black students in return for the county's money. The
county received state funds on the basis of the average daily
attendance of each student. The public schools of Shelby County
(1935) and Shelbyville (1937) agreed to send the allotment for
blacks to Lincoln.
Soon, other counties began to make similar arrangements
with Lincoln. Although it was a boarding school, Lincoln began
to enroll day students. 43 The state legislature passed a bill
in 1937 allowing bussing for the purpose of segregating public
schools. The Board was responsible for the transportation of
blacks to other counties if their own did not have an approved
high school. In this way the state offered to meet its respon-
sibility to black students. While there is no proof that the
state was responding to the desegregation cases there was more
concern that blacks attend "approved" black schools. Lincoln
served the state's responsibility to provide equal education
(Map 3). That year, 30 school districts enrolled their students
at Lincoln. Lincoln received $14,000 from the state for their
education. Lincoln gained more state aid when it agreed to
become a teacher-training center for Kentucky State College (1939).
Lincoln became publicly supported through indirect state
funds under these arrangements. Its usefulness in the segregated
system increased the demand for Lincoln's services. Its sound
reputation attracted students from all over the state. As Lin-
coln's population increased, its physical plant required expan-
sion and improvement. Indirect aid was not sufficient for these
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needs and Lincoln entered into a direct contract with the state.
In 1944, the legislature appropriated $40,000 to Lincoln for
the next two years. By 1947, Lincoln agreed to deed the proper-
ty to the state.44 The state was willing to support the private
school for blacks since Lincoln provided equal education in
the public school system. Lincoln's existence lent strength to
the segregated system.
The system of segregation changed during the early twen-
tieth century under pressure from blacks, public opinion and the
law. Black schools produced a leadership that was determined
to use its skill to overcome segregation. Blacks turned their
isolated and literary protests into a social reform movement
when the promise held by education failed to improve their status.
Their dissatisfaction was augmented by the contradictions of
their involvement in America's war. As domestic policy toward
blacks became more favorable, the legal system became more at-
tuned to the right of blacks to receive equal treatment.
Legal authority continued to support the "separate but equal"
doctrine but moved towards a greater concern for the "equality"
in that principle. Landmark desegregation cases from 1935 to
1950 marked the change in judicial attitude. The failure of
some states to grant equal protection to its blacks in higher
education was acknowledged; standards for equality were con-
sidered, including intangible factors which made the black school
inferior; anddesegregation was required as a remedy to injustice
under segregation. These decisions were legal victories for
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the black struggle. The N.A.A.C.P. emerged as the representa-
tive of black Americans. Civil rights advocacy began to view
association with whites as a guarantee of equal protection and
equal educational achievement. This philosophy was internal-
ized by the N.A.A.C.P. and projected to the Court. As a result
of the pre-Brown cases, many higher institutions integrated a
token number of blacks. Most states with segregation were anx-
ious to avoid a battle on the elementary and secondary level.
Their efforts to equalize black schools succeeded in some cases
but by then it was too late. The practical gains from segrega-
tion no longer held the interest of some blacks, particularly
those in the national civil rights struggle. By the early 50's
the N.A.A.C.P. held that segregation per se was the object of
attack, the goal--integration.
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Chapter III
Issues and Impact of the Brown Decision
The climax of the N.A.A.C.P. public school desegregation
cases was Brown v. Board of Education. The N.A.A.C.P. com-
bined school segregation cases from Kansas, Virginia, South
Carolina and Delaware to win a favorable judicial decision with
national implication. These cases represented different sec-
tions of the country, involved secondary and grammar school
students and included permissive as well as mandatory segrega-
tion statutes. They covered a range of interests in desegrega-
tion and were introduced collectively as Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation. The Court's decision became the most important ruling
in civil rights during the twentieth century.
In each of the school segregation cases, black children
were denied admission to white schools under state segregation
laws. Federal district courts upheld the action of local
boards of education on the basis of the "separate but equal"
doctrine. The plaintiffs, through the N.A.A.C.P., complained
that segregated public schools were not, nor could they be
made equal hence, black children were denied equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. On May 17, 1954 the Supreme
Court confronted the issue of segregation in public schools.
It cited the ruling of Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt and McLaurin;
however, none of these cases directly reviewed the "separate
but equal" doctrine.
The Court in Brown "refused to turn back the clock . .
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to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written," because educa-
tional opportunity had become ". . . a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms."45 Therefore, the ques-
tion before the Court was, "Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportun-
ities." 4 6 To answer the question the Court relied on current
social science data on the effect of segregation on Negro
children. The findings were that ". . . segregation of white
and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
on the colored children. . . . the policy of separating the
races is interpreted as denoting inferiority of the negro . . .
Segregation . . . has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of negro children and to deprive them
of . . . the benefits . . . they would receive in an integrated
school system."47 The Court concluded that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 48
With this decision American law finally came to terms with the
professed ideals of liberty and freedom and its treatment of
black citizens. Brown was a decisive legal victory for civil
rights, yet it did not relieve the supremist attitude of many
whites. Brown prohibited state-imposed segregation in public
schools but it left many important questions unanswered.
One of the first issues that emerged from Brown was the
proper remedy to unequal segregated schooJs. Brown said that
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segregation had "no place" in public schools but it did not
overrule other forms of segregation. The Court simply ruled
against segregated schools because of their harm to black
children; it did not indicate that segregation per se had
equally harmful effects on the attitudes of white children.
The Court failed to state that the superior feelings of white
children were as negative a consequence of segregation as the
inferior feelings of black children--that both effects were
inextricably linked and integration was beneficial to all stu-
dents. By limiting the problem to blacks, the Court narrowed
the solution to the integration of the minority into the main-
stream. It did not suggest that the system of segregation
itself was wrong or that whites would have to relinquish their
control over blacks with desegregation. The unwillingness of
the Court to express the breadth of the issue in segregation
allowed it to escape a remedy guaranteeing integration for
both races. It provided a means for whites to avoid associa-
tion with a large number of blacks. Even token integration
was delayed and resisted with the sanction of law. One year
after Brown, the Court gave local white school boards and
courts permission to avoid immediate compliance with desegre-
gation.
In Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
the manner of relief for unequal segregated schools was handed
down. The Court stated, "School authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating . . . and solving these problems
* . . courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation
. . . [they] will require that the defendants make a prompt
and reasonable start towards full compliance . . . at the
earliest practicable date." The cases were remanded to dis-
trict courts with orders to desegregate "with all deliberate
speed.",9
Under the "all deliberate speed" concept, black children
were denied immediate relief to the "psychological harm" of
segregated schools. Brown II gave the authority of desegrega-
tion plans to local school boards which had committed them-
selves to segregation for a half century. This responsibility
was misplaced since the district court's requirement of a
"prompt and reasonable" start towards desegregation further
allowed resistance to the law. The Court's position was jus-
tified by some scholars on the grounds that one decree could
not be expected to overturn a system based on the segregation
of 9 million white and 3 million black children. It was argued
that the Court did not have the political authority to impose
deadlines on local school systems under legislative authority. 5 0
Whether the Court had the power to demand greater local compli-
ance in 1954 is a matter of scholarly debate. The effect of
Brown II was that school boards and local courts delayed, evaded
and openly resisted compliance with Brown I for two decades.
The white public's response to Brown was mixed; some
greeted the decision with tolerance while others vowed to
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maintain the segregated system. Often official policy and
citizen reaction conflicted, resulting in stated compliance
with desegregation and the practice of segregation. In Ken-
tucky, the Governor issued a decree to comply with Brown.
The city of Louisville worked diligently to bring about a
peaceful transition. Citizens groups arranged inter-racial
conferences and task forces met to aid the new policy. In
1956, the city schools were desegregated without incidence.
However, white "flight" to the suburbs began and eventually
all the inner city schools were black.51 Residential segre-
gation, in this and many other cases, caused de facto segrega-
tion of the schools. Desegregation resulted in a form of
segregation not covered by Brown. Judicial decree did not
disuade whites from avoiding association with blacks, only
the method changed under desegregation law. Whites were able
to protect themselves from co-mingling with blacks by erecting
residential conclaves that overtly or covertly barred blacks.
The result was the same as legal segregation; black and white
children were attending racially homogeneous schools ten years
after Brown.
The Associational Issue in Brown
Many critics said that Brown failed to settle the associ-
ational aspects of desegregation. First, the Court did not
distinguish between the associational and educational conse-
quences of integration. While the. Court clearly prohibited
segregation in public schools because of the violation against
the equal protection clause, it went beyond the constitutional
issue and inferred that educational success was based on blacks
associating with whites. The assumption was derived from
social science data suggesting that integration yielded identi-
cal academic achievement. Edmond Cahn voiced disapproval of
the use of the social science work in Brown. ". . . The con-
stitutional rights of Negroes . . . [should not] rest on such
flimsy foundation . . . the behavioral sciences are young, im-
precise and changeful . . . It would be quite a thing to have
our fundamental rights change along with . . . latest psycho-
,52logical literature." Others argued that Brown was a strict-
ly constitutional issue and could have been supported without
social science.53 Although the social science data was not
the basis for Brown, its inclusion helped the Court concur
that segregation was bad because of its effect on black child-
ren. The remedies which followed suggested that desegregation
required a majority white presence if blacks were to improve
their academic performance. Prohibition of segregation was
interpreted as opposition to majority black schools. Desegre-
gation, implied by Brown, was limited to those situations where
blacks were in the minority. Black schools, therefore, were
identified as the cause of black student underachievement.
This line of reasoning was promoted by the N.A.A.C.P. and
white liberals during and after the Brown decision. Integra-
tion, they believed, was the panacea for past racial injustice.
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So strong was their belief in integration as the means for
achieving equality that it was pursued as a goal in itself.
In particular, they assumed that academic outcome was direct-
ly related to the degree that blacks associated with whites.
"Equal opportunity" became measured by the number of whites
in a school. Given the past limitations, inequal resources
and demeaning connotations of black schools under segregation,
it is understandable that such faith was placed in integra-
tion. The integrationist philosophy found its way into the
legal forum as the N.A.A.C.P. approached the bench in Brown.
By adopting this theory, the N.A.A.C.P. hoped that Brown would
bring about the association of black and white students and
that association would bring equal educational results. The
civil rights group concentrated on integration as the means
of achieving equal opportunity based on the failure of the
"separate but equal" schools to bring social and economic
equality; it did not anticipate that the promise of integra-
tion would be unfulfilled and unsupported by white public pol-
icy, school boards and legal authority.
The failure of Brown to bring about integrated public
schools by 1959 prompted many blacks and some legal scholars
to question the basis of that decision. Again, the Court's
confusion of the equal protection and association issues raised
criticism. Herbert Wechsler, a distinguished legal scholar,
stated that the Court should have directly confronted the as-
sociational aspect rather than using it only as an indication
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of black pupil performance. He stated that judicial assump-
tion of the value of integration ignored whether the child
was happy or whether integration brought equally harmful ef-
fects from white hostility. Brown failed to consider the
attitude of the black community towards forced desegregation.
Wechsler held that the issue in segregation was a neutral con-
stitutional principle of the freedom to associate. The state-
imposed denial of this right worked equally on both races
without making blacks assume the burden of showing inequality.
He stated that the Court failed to explain why it favored
blacks who wanted association over whites who wanted not to
associate.54 Brown ignored the race association question
which was the basis for the "separate but equal" doctrine. By
not addressing the weakness of the white supremist policy res-
ponsible for segregation, Brown left whites believing they
could maintain this attitude and practice segregation if they
did not involve the state.
Wechsler's concern over the associational issue was
warranted. After Brown, public policy ignored the responsib-
ility of whites as well as blacks to make sacrifices in the
interest of desegregation. Education plans placed the bulk
of the integration burden on black students. Black schools
in the South were dismantled with little regard for the needs
of their students. Without concern for the performance of
pupils, desegregation plans frowned upon majority black schools.
Educational policy, which historically had encouraged the idea
that black schools were inferior, took a logical, racist
step under desegregation law and concluded that integration
was only valid when whites were in the majority. Brown did
not define desegregation in terms that worked equally on both
groups. As desegregation plans went into effect, the status,
privilege and control which accrued to white America because
of past racist policies was still protected by the law.
Impact of Brown
The period following Brown from 1955-1963 brought few
tangible results in the area of school desegregation. Brown
inspired the civil rights movement of the sixties and broke
down many barriers to inequality. However, after 1963 blacks
began to question whether integration was the only valid means
of achieving their goal. The failure of the Court to demand
more than token integration of white schools was disillusion-
ing. Some civil rights groups, like the N.A.A.C.P. held on
to the integration ideal, but more blacks became cautious of
the misuse of desegregation to destroy their institutions. Be-
tween 1963 and 1967 the lower courts struggled to evolve de-
segregation standards without the guidance of the Supreme Court.
Finally the Court became impatient with the slow process of
desegregation. In Green v. County School Board of New Kent
(1968) the Court charged the school board with the "affirmative
duty" to create a desegregation plan that worked immediately.
After Green, school authorities concentrated on racial balanc-
ing schemes to meet the Court's requirement. The call for
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"immediate action" in Alexander v. Holmes (1969) and massive
desegregation in Carter v. West Feliciana School Board (1970)
ended the delay of southern school desegregation.55
Between 1970-1971, public schools in the South were sub-
stantially integrated by court orders based almost exclusively
on integration statistics.56 Acceptable standards for deseg-
regation were usually disfavorable to majority black schools.
The assumption was that integration required blacks to attend
majority white schools. In an attempt to comply with new
desegregation orders, many desegregation plans called for the
closing of majority black schools. In Bell v. West Point, 444
F.2d 1362 (1971) and Gordon v. Jefferson, 330 F.Supp. 1119 (1971)
local school board's closed all black schools for fear that
whites would not attend former black institutions. Although
the Court ruled that the closing of black schools for racial
reasons was not constitutionally permissible under Brown, it
stated that, "unless the court can determine an . . . impermis-
sible sacrifice on the part of the black community [by closing
of the school] the law does not require the court to intervene
. . . if the closing of these facilities can be justified on
any non-racial grounds then the school board was justified."57
In other words, the black community carried the burden of de-
segregation and the black school was threatened with dismantl-
ing unless it could prove that a constitutional infraction
would result from its closing.
The most famous Court decision to date which marked the
law's ambiguous position on majority black schools was
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (1971). The school plan for
the county in 1970 called for a 71/29% white/black ratio in
the school system. To enact the plan widespread bussing
had to occur. The district court upheld the racial balanc-
ing concept but the Fourth Circuit reversed the bussing por-
tion of the plan. The Supreme Court ruling was anxiously
awaited by all federal courts. The Court ruled that racial
balancing was not required by the Constitution, but that "aware-
ness of racial composition was a useful starting point in shap-
ing a remedy."' To the issue of one race schools the response
was, "that the existence of one race schools [was] not in and
of itself a mark . . . of . . . segregation. [Yet] constitu-
tional duty warrants a presumption against [one-race schools] .58
Swann did not resolve the issue of racial balancing but did
suggest that integration ratios calling for blacks to attend
majority white schools were a "useful starting point." The
presumption against one race schools worked against majority
black schools without guaranteeing integrated education for
all black children. Although Bell and Gordon forbid the clos-
ing of black schools solely because of race, the burden of
dismantling schools fell to blacks. The practice of closing
schools in most cases was abandonned for a more subtle tactic
accomplishing the same end. Black schools were merged or con-
solidated with white institutions to become "racially uniden-
tifiable." Desegregation plans in the early 70's continued
59
to make demands of blacks that were not made of whites.
A token number of blacks at a white school satisfied
desegregation requirements while a similar proportion of
whites at a black school identified the school as segregated.
For example, Tennessee State University (a black school) was
required to desegregate its facilities in 1970. At the same
time the state legislature passed a bill placing a branch of
the white University of Tennessee next to T.S.U. White stu-
dents in the area chose to attend the University of Tennessee,
so T.S.U. had trouble attracting white students. In addition
to forced competition with the white school, T.S.U. was re-
quired by state educators to double its white faculty and
triple its white student body. A comparable request increasing
the number of blacks at the white university was not made.
The effect was that T.S.U. was substantially weakened and under
greater white control, whereas white students were provided
with a school so they would not have to attend the black univ-
ersity.59
Many schools lost their racial identity as whites tried
to gain control of the desegregated system. Formerly black
West Virginia State became 75% white, Bluefield (W. Va.) be-
came 80% white and Lincoln (Mo.) University became 51% white.
Delaware State, Bowie (Md.) State and Kentucky State became
30-40% white. Other institutions like Arkansas AM&N and Flo-
rida A&M were merged with larger white schools with no guaran-
tee that their students or faculty would be retained. 60
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The dismantling of the black schools occurred without
concern for the effect upon black students and faculty. In
Missouri, the growth of black lawyers remained stable after
the closing of the black law school. Similar incidents oc-
curred with the closing of South Carolina State and Florida
A&M Law Schools. Black students in Florida had trouble gain-
ing admission to white schools when their junior colleges closed
in 1965, producing a drastic decline in the total number of
blacks in junior college.61 Black teachers had difficulty
finding jobs when merger with white schools occurred. In 1974,
the Urban League reported the loss of 30,000 jobs and $250
million dollars to blacks because desegregation failed to ab-
sorb them into the "unitary" system. 62
Many blacks viewed the dismantling of black schools as
a political tool used by state legislatures to tighten state
budgets and destroy the political leadership which emerged
from black institutions. Black schools were responsible for
the development of leadership in the early desegregation liti-
gation, the civil rights movement, and the black power movement.
Without control of these schools, black political activity
was curtailed. For example, Fort Valley, Georgia filed a suit
to compel the integration of the local black state college
whose student voters put blacks in control of city elections.
Merger with white institutions resulted in the decline of
black leaders and professionals. "Where black leadership
threatened the interests of the community . . . segregated
public schools [were] consolidated or closed." 63
More importantly, blacks felt that the merger of their
schools was simply an extension of white supremacy rather than
a true interest in desegregation. The superior attitude of
whites based on slavery and the "separate but equal" policy
remained after Brown. The law did not identify the problem
of segregation as the false expectations both races derived
from the system. Rather, the burden and solution to inequal-
ity was placed upon blacks alone. Whites were led to believe
that they could continue to set the standards of equality and
maintain majority control under desegregation. Chancellor
Lawrence Davis of Arkansas AM&N spoke for many black schools
when he said, "This school will become predominantly white
because whites feel that if they must integrate then they must
control . . . there is a determination not to permit this
school to integrate and retain a black administration. . . .
White people must control institutions which white people
attend in large numbers."64 For the most part, white Ameri-
cans remained hostile to race associations in public schools
that in any way threaten to diminish the status they once
received from legal segregation.
The Dismantling of Lincoln Institute
The dismantling of Lincoln was a slow and painful process,
taking fifteen years and two phases of desegregation to com-
plete. Lincoln became disfavored as a black school with a
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token number of whites and as a fully integrated school with
white and black associating in near equal numbers. It was a
symbol of white supremacy and when desegregation threatened
to destroy the status it provided, local whites had it closed.
After Brown, Lincoln's administration immediately opened
its doors to white students. White parents refused to send
their children to Lincoln and school officials were unwilling
to force integration. In fact, school superintendents were
anxious to retain Lincoln as a school for blacks. In Febru-
ary and March of 1955, Lincoln's president received twenty
letters of praise from superintendents encouraging the school
to continue its service to blacks from the counties.6 5 Although
forty white adults finally registered for night school, the
state never viewed Lincoln as desegregated. While forty whites
out of four hundred blacks was a greater degree of integration
than the three per cent average number of blacks enrolling at
former white schools in the county, Lincoln was still a major-
ity black school.66 Post-Brown integration ratios, later
supported by Swann, required a majority white presence. Under
the popular definition of integration, Lincoln was a segregated
school.
The state legislature continued to support Lincoln, but
it made two decisions to encourage state-wide desegregation
which indirectly cut the bulk of the school's finances. First,
it decreed that bussing could not be used to segregate the
races in public schools. State-supported bussing which carried
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students to Lincoln since 1937 was abandonned. Day students
from the six neighboring counties could not attend Lincoln
after 1955. Second, it stated that the Board of Education
could not finance segregated schools indirectly through con-
tracts with public schools. Public schools outside of Lin-
coln's district were forbidden to transfer state funds (aver-
age daily attendance allowance) to Lincoln for the education
of its black students. The only ADA money available to Lin-
coln came from Shelby county students. Black parents outside
the area were forced to pay tuition.67
The erosion of state-wide segregation weakened Lincoln's
financial strength. Few black parents could afford private
school education and without county funds the majority of
students could not attend Lincoln for long. The cut in public
funds threatened Lincoln's viability; maintenance of 450 acres
alone required ample funding not forthcoming after 1955. Still,
Lincoln was a valuable academic institution which had served
both the educational needs of blacks and segregationist inte-
rests of whites for fifty years. There were few people in the
state who wanted to see the only effective "separate but equal"
school closed. The Courier-Journal, August 6, 1956, raised
the dilemma presented by Lincoln.
The Supreme Court decision has not raised
a similar question elsewhere . . . No other
state supports a Negro high school quite
like this $1,500,000 plant. . . nor in all
of the state is there a school for either
race which offers so rich an education. . . .
Lincoln is extraordinary.. . . It follows
that its future in a desegregated public
school system raises extraordinary questions.
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The issue at hand was whether the state, acting in the
interest of the public, was willing to allow a black school
which was effective to continue without the benefits of
segregation. Black parents, for their part continued within
the limitations of their income to support Lincoln. In aca-
demic year 1958-1959, 360 students at Lincoln represented 32
different school districts--31 of which did not supply tuition
from public funds.68 Black educators, aware of the inferior
white schools blacks often attended after desegregation, voiced
continued support of Lincoln. President Atwood of Kentucky
State warned, "The Supreme Court has already settled the right
of Negro youth to a public education, now to deny them the
right to choose between inferior and superior education would
be as unsound as the denial of his right to study with white
classmates."69 Black parents' preference for the best possible
education sustained Lincoln despite desegregation. They in-
dicated that the education Lincoln provided was more important
than the method of integration. Their goal was equal education-
al achievement; their conflict was with the N.A.A.C.P. which
viewed integration as the sole means of reaching that end.
The N.A.A.C.P., in its committment to integration, began
to see Lincoln as a threat to that goal by 1961. Over half
the black children in the state were still in poor, segregatnd
schools.70 They believed that closing or integrating Lincc 7ould
speed up the process of desegregation. It exerted subtle p
sure on the community to give Lincoln up. Black educators
65
were placed in an awkward position by the drive for majority
white schools. Most were also members of the N.A.A.C.P. and
were sympathetic to the interests of the organization. Yet,
they recognized the purely academic value of Lincoln and did
not want the quality of education diminished for black students.7 1
The final responsibility for Lincoln's future fell to the
state. Either the Board of Education could 1) recognize that
40 white adults met the desegregation requirement, 2) force
white students from Shelby county to integrate Lincoln, 3) close
the school, or 4) dismantle it and turn over the responsibility
for integration to another sponsor.
The option to regard Lincoln as desegregated was ignored
because integration standards promoted at the time required a
majority white presence. The definition of integration was
limited to tokenism at white schools. Educational policy, in-
dicated in the Swann school plan considered black schools es-
sentially segregated unless whites made up more than 20 per cent
of the enrollment. The second remedy, integrating Lincoln
with white students from the county, threatened to destroy the
status and control whites enjoyed by letting Lincoln remain
black. School officials were not willing to let white students
come under a black administration and white parents recoiled
at the idea of integrating even a good school which was designed
for blacks. Whites were not content to associate with blacks
at an institution which they did not control. They praised
Lincoln for its academic quality but also viewed it as a "place
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for blacks." The status they derived from not associating
with blacks on equal terms was more important than the caliber
of education for their children. Rather than forfeit status
or control, white parents and school officials allowed Lincoln
to be dismantled.72
By 1965, Lincoln's enrollment had declined considerably.
The lack of public funds forced many parents to withdraw their
children. The school increasingly relied on private students
outside the state. From as far away as Arizona, children of
alumni and "difficult" children were sent to Lincoln if they
could pay tuition. Yet, these efforts were not sufficient to
maintain the expenses of the vast physical plant. Lincoln was
dependent on public support and while the segregated system
willingly assumed its costs, desegregation placed Lincoln in
a financially tenuous situation. The state's refusal to con-
sider the first two options weakened Lincoln's chance of sur-
vival. The legislature did not want to support Lincoln for
the education of only seventy-five students so in March, 1965
they voted to close it down.7 3
Lincoln's administration and other black educators appeal-
led to the state to find another use for Lincoln that would
be consistent with desegregation. They did not have the legal
expertise or financial strength to contest the school's closing
because of its racial composition. However, they did recognize
that desegregation was sweeping the South and believed that
integration of some sort was inevitable. Lincoln could not
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continue to exist as a quasi-public institution without
ample public funds. The administration consented to Lincoln's
dismantling with the understanding that another institution
with financial and political strength would take responsibil-
ity for the integration of the facilities. 74
The legislature awarded $10,000 to the Spindletop Research
Corporation to determine the best possible use for the school.
The report concluded that the Institute should be changed to
the Lincoln School--an experimental high school for poor but
gifted blacks and mountain whites. When Lincoln Institute closed
in June, 1965, the legislature approved plans for the Lincoln
School. Everyone except the local white community was satis-
fied with the prospect of the new school. The state had avoid-
ed the difficulty of integrating Lincoln with white public school
students while appeasing influential black educators and civil
rights leaders. Blacks gave up their "separate but equal"
school for what they felt was a legitimate alternative; Lincoln,
they believed, would be protected as a fully integrated high
school. The compromise between the state and educators at
Lincoln was crucial because it took the responsibility for in-
tegration off the public sector. Without the active interest
of the state or the educators, Lincoln School was doomed to
fail. Integration at the old Lincoln Institute was strongly
opposed by members of the local white community. Lincoln, in
that form, was unacceptable because it allowed blacks and
whites to freely associate on equal terms. Lincoln School was
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almost identical to the Berea College experiment of the 19th
century and local hostility to the co-education of the races
was equally as strong.
The Lincoln School began in September, 1966 under the
supervision of the University of Kentucky. The board of trust-
ees included members of the Board of Education, Kentucky State
College and the University of Kentucky. The property was owned
by an independent board called the Lincoln Foundation and the
state provided the bulk of the funds but the University of Ken-
tucky was the primary sponsor and administrator. The physical
plant was refurbished and the faculty was rehired. Although
many black staff remained from the Institute, an equal number
of whites, including the director, were hired. The student
body was reduced to 100--60 black and 40 white. In four years,
"young girls from bleak Appalachian hamlets . . . and Louisville
youths from homes where nobody dreamed of college" proved that
academic achievement was possible despite poverty and racism.
The integrated education was successful and all forty of the
1970 graduating class received college scholarships. Lincoln
School had a full time psychologist and psychiatric social
worker for the students. There was one teacher for every six
pupils. The small student-teacher ratio and campus atmosphere
was cited for its effect on pupil performance. The director
noted that the environment at Lincoln was controlled 24 hours
a day whereas at a day school the student often went home to
a troubled atmosphere.76 Albert Farrow, a freshman and son of
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a sharecropper whose siblings were school drop-outs explained,
"you can work 24 hours a day here and at night the teachers
are on hand for teaching or just talking. They have a real
,77interest in you as a person." The 100 students clearly en-
joyed and benefited from Lincoln School but whites in the county
were not pleased with the integrated facilities.
The local newspaper bitterly complained about the new
school.
On balance it would appear that Shelby
County, its educational system and speci-
fically, its Negroes have lost more than
they've gained from the establishment of
the Lincoln School. The county has lost
the use of some very excellent facilities
and an outstanding faculty which had been
assembled to principally educate Shelby
County children, and as a result our systems
have had to absorb into already overcrowded
schools the several hundred youngsters who
would have been educated at Lincoln Institute.
Despite heroic efforts, the city school board
in particular is still struggling with the 78
nightmarish after-effects of Lincoln's closing.
Local citizens seemed to feel that blacks were responsible for
the closing of Lincoln Institute and the overcrowding of county
schools. Townspeople in Shelbyville were angry over the crowd-
ing of their schools with black students. Yet, when they had
the opportunity to integrate Lincoln themselves after Brown
they refused. They did not take the chance to utilize the
"excellent facilities and outstanding faculty" for their child-
ren because the school was run by blacks. When the Lincoln
School integrated the facilities despite their wishes, the
real issue was the association of black and white children. The
hostility to race association which threatened white status
was as great in 1970 as it was in 1904.
Despite the academic success of the Lincoln School stu-
dents, Shelby county parents tried to force the school to close.
Look magazine found that most people at Lincoln believed that
the whites were more concerned about interracial dating than
anything else. A white minister said, "What aroused the ire
of some of the townspeople was the fact that the school was
co-educational and bi-racial." "The sight of an interracial
couple blew the minds of the white people in town," said a stu-
dent, "at the basis was pure racism--black and white kids to-
gether." The article concluded, "Going down the drain is one
of the most hopeful experiments in integrated living in Kentucky
history."79
Lincoln School, like the Berea College experiment, ended
because whites feared the consequences of race association.
Almalgamation threatened white status in both cases and the
gains of second reconstruction--post-Brown desegregation--were
abruptly halted. White citizens of Shelby county begrudgingly
accepted 3 per cent minority enrollment at the local white
school. However, they refused to let Lincoln, which was de-
signed to segregate blacks, integrate equal numbers of black
and white children. They persuaded Congressman Mack Walters,
Jr. to introduce a bill closing the school. His father, Mack
Walters, Sr. led the town's protest against Lincoln in 1910.
Sixty years later, the basic white supremist attitude remained
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strong and persuasive. The legislature agreed to close the
school on the basis of high cost. The University of Kentucky
was unwilling to take a financial loss by protesting the state's
action since the school was only experimental and not of fund-
amental interest. The state was the main proponent and finan-
cier; without its support no group wanted to take on Lincoln's
responsibility. Black educators were upset with the closing
but had no legal, political or financial power to change the
decision.80 Lincoln School had no allies and was closed in
July, 1970.
Desegregation law did not change the townspeople's hostil-
ity toward race co-mingling. Furthermore, desegregation did
not suggest that the status derived from separate schools was
no longer valid nor could almalgation be discouraged by law.
Desegregation allowed whites to avoid any racial relationships
that seriously jeopardized their status. They only acknowledged
forms of integration which left them in the majority and in
control. Situations like the co-education of races at a pri-
vate school which suggested that race association was voluntary
and on equal terms, were opposed. The white supremist attitude
was left unquestioned. The final irony in Lincoln's history
occurred one year after the closing. Whitney Young, Jr., a
prominent civil rights leader and the son of Lincoln's presi-
dent, died in March, 1971. In a politically-inspired gesture,
former President Nixon decided to memorialize the place where
Young was born and educated. He turned the idle physical facil-
ity into an industrial training center for black men--commonly
called a manpower program--for two years. For a civil rights
leader to be commemorated by a demeaning, ineffective, racist
program--later cut by the President--was demoralizing enough.
That Lincoln Institute--which struggled to overcome the limit-
ation of industrial training to produce such leaders--was re-
turned to its original purpose seventy years later indicated
the consistency of American racism.
During the twenty years following Brown, local courts
and school authorities struggled to devise desegregation plans
which did not conflict with white status. Brown declared that
the state had a constitutional duty to provide equal education-
al opportunity for black as well as white citizens. However,
the remedies to past injustice were restricted to those situa-
tions where whites remained in control. Desegregation was
limited to a majority white presence but even then, integration
per se was not guaranteed. Desegregation dismantled many
black schools while leaving white schools uncommitted to full
integration. The Court's failure to rule on de facto segrega-
tion condemned black children in the ghetto to majority black
schools without hope of gaining financial equity. Northern
and western ghetto schools were left segregated and southern
black schools were dismantled and placed under white control.
White public policy, with the permission of the law, placed
the limits on desegregation just short of any threat to the
status quo.
Desegregation law was not useless; indeed, integration of
public schools in the South had positive consequences for
some black students. The legal protection of black students'
rights to attend white schools had ethical and practical
merit. However, the failure of Brown to bring about more
positive results demanded criticism of the theory and remedy
evolving from that decision. By concentrating on the harm
that segregation rendered to black children, Brown ignored the
responsibility to state that segregation was dangerous because
of the false self-concepts which it produced in both groups.
Brown left racist policies in tact by failing to indicate that
white supremacy was an equally negative effect of segregation.
Consequently, remedies following Brown allowed whites to escape
solutions which would guarantee equity in educational opportun-
ities for both races. Blacks were not able to control majority
black schools or to gain financial equity in poor, ghetto school
districts. Desegregation destroyed the little authority blacks
had gained in the "separate but equal" schools without promising
full integration under the new system. Judicial and public
hostility to majority black schools under desegregation eroded
one of the most powerful institutions in the black community.
Some blacks also contributed to the demise of the school
by not anticipating the failure of integration as a theoretical
or practical guarantee of equal educational outcome. The N.A.A.C.P.
in particular maintained. the hope that integration was the vi-
able remedy to inequality. However, as desegregation continued
without significant improvement of black pupil performance,
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black parents began to look for other means of achieving the
best schooling for their children. They began to regard the
integration which followed Brown "like slavery and segregation,
as one more device by which the majority [was] served and con-
trol over blacks maintained." 81
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The development of the black school reflected racist
public policy, the struggle of blacks for equality, and the
conflicting role of the law as protector of public interest
and national ideals. The black school was used by each race
to aid its social status; whites used it to maintain their
supremacy and blacks used it to gain equality. Judicial de-
cisions responded to white status concerns and the constitu-
tional requirement that blacks receive equal protection of the
law. The law upheld the blacks' interest in education but
allowed local educators--on behalf of white citizens--to under-
mine the equality of the black school. Although the effective-
ness of the black school was not destroyed, its purely academic
function was overshadowed by its use in racial politics.
The black school was established to satisfy the segregated
system and the state's responsibility to protect the education-
al interests of blacks. Judicial decisions like Plessy, Cum-
mings and Berea recognized both the status concern of whites
and the legal requirement of equal protection; the "separate
but equal" policy established a racial doctrine which colored
the school system for almost a century. Public policy permitted
blacks to receive equal education as long as it didn't threaten
white supremacy. In 1896 enforced or voluntary association
of the races in any social situation constituted a threat to
racial purity, i.e., the distinction between inferior and sup-
erior races. Legal segregation was pervasive and co-education
of the races was strictly prohibited. Even integration of pri-
vate schools like Berea was forbidden because of the potential
equalization of the races.
The Court refused to establish standards for the "equal"
requirement of the Plessy doctrine and allowed local school
officials to betray the promose of education. The supremist
policy influenced the educational curriculum for black schools.
Educators from the North and South used industrial training to
institutionalize the inferiority of blacks. Special education
was designed to justify discrimination and unequal spending for
the black school.
Inspite of the obvious determination of whites to return
them to the position of slaves, blacks persisted in their strug-
gle for equality. Blacks believed in the principles expressed
by American ideology and held fast to the promise of education.
There were different opinions on the type of curriculum provided
in separate schools but the use of the black school as a means
to an end was undisputed. To guard against the misuse of spec-
ial education to retain blacks at an inferior position, blacks
worked and cheated to transform the industrial focus into a
regular curriculum. They accepted the form of special educa-
tion to appease the white public but translated its substance
to meet black needs.
The twentieth century did not bring the desired result
of equal treatment. Despite black academic achievement, the
segregated system refused to respect the civil rights of the
minority. The disappointed professionals which emerged from
the black school vowed to fight the principle of segregation.
The black protest found greater national sympathy in the mid-
thirties after the war. Reasserted American ideals of freedom
and equality conflicted with the nation's blatant discrimination
against blacks. The increased tolerance of black civil rights
forced the Court to modify its segregationist policy when it
confronted the higher education cases.
The leniency of public opinion allowed the Court of the
30's and 40's to set standards of quality for the black school.
When public policy was firmly against any association of the
races the Court said that the provision of a black school was
sufficient to meet the requirement of equal protection. How-
ever, in thirty years the states had failed to produce equal
facilities for blacks, particularly in higher education. The
Court could have required that the black schools be equalized
as a remedy to the plaintiffs' grievances in early desegregation
cases. But, unlike the days of Plessy when black rights were
only given lip-service, the failure of the "separate but equal"
doctrine and the heightened awareness of American ideology
caused the Court to issue another remedy. The increased inter-
est in black rights permitted blacks to attend white colleges
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and graduate schools when the states failed to provide equal
black facilities--judged by both tangible and intangible fac-
tors.
Early desegregation cases helped to improve many black
schools and integrated higher education with a token number of
blacks. The equalization of schools was an attempt by whites
to maintain separate schools on the secondary and elementary
levels. However, the N.A.A.C.P. was not content to call atten-
tion to black educational rights under the segregated system.
The early litigation was merely a prelude to an attack on the
"separate but equal" doctrine. To achieve a reevaluation of
the segregationist policy, the N.A.A.C.P. used social science
data to illustrate the ill-effects of segregation upon black
children. It based its case on the notion that the inferior
attitudes produced by the black school denied the children
equal protection of the law. The disappointment of the "sepa-
rate but equal" system and the black school's heritage of de-
pendency and victimization produced the conclusion that black
children suffered because they were separated from whites. The
promise of integration to produce equal educational outcome
led the N.A.A.C.P. to pursue the integration ideal with tenacity.
The identification of integration as the sole means of achiev-
ing equality contributed to the dismantling of the black school.
The N.A.A.C.P. believed that the benefits of integration out-
weighed the positive aspects of the black school. It was overly
destructive to its own institution because it did not anticipate
the continuance of the supremist attitude under desegregation.
In 1954 the Court ruled that segregation had no place in
public schools; the law finally recognized that segregation,
as it had been implemented, did not protect the educational
interests of blacks equally. It did not say that segregation
in form was unconstitutional or that desegregation compelled
whites to give up the privileges and benefits of supremacy.
The law protected racist policy by guaranteeing only equal
education which did not offend the status quo. Desegregation
required that the state and its agencies not discriminate; it
did not rule out citizen action--such as de facto segregation
--which was discriminatory. State schools were allowed to
serve the interests of segregation and white supremacy, not
by direct policy, but by passive sanction. The Court in Brown,
like Plessy, permitted local school officials to limit the remedies
for the
/educational needs of black students. When desegregation plans
were finally implemented they were disfavorable to majority
black schools and placed whites in control of most schools in
the "unitary" system. Under this process, many black schools
in the South were dismantled. The needs of black students
were not considered and white schools were not forced to absorb
desegregated blacks into the unitary system. In fact, no com-
mitment to full integration was made by the Court or the white
public. Desegregation, with the exception of a minority of
black students, limited rather than expanded the remedies to
past educational discrimination.
Thus, the development and underdevelopment of the black
school was marked by a consistent white interest in maintaining
the status quo. Segregation tried to limit its effectiveness
through inferior academic programs and unequal funding and de-
segregation suggested that the only legitimate education occur-
red in a majority white setting, hence the viability of the
black school was further undermined. Desegregation, like seg-
regation, assumed the right of whites to control and the black
school was misused to institutionalize that authority.
Blacks used the school to further their status under both
systems. During segregation they supported it as a means of
achieving equality and during desegregation they used it as
an example of their unequal treatment. The failure of segregated
education to bring equality made the school an instrument in
the argument for integration. Blacks historically disagreed
on the type of education they needed--industrial or classic,
integrated or predominantly black--but their use of education
as a means to the goal of equality was accepted by the entire
community. Their interest in eliminating the caste/class sys-
tem was steadfast.
The issue was and continues to be whether America which
professes the concepts of freedom, liberty, and equal treatment
for all citizens can continue to cater to the status needs of
the majority. In conclusion, it seems appropriate to charge
the Court with the resolution of this conflict. The issue is
non-negotiable and the interest groups are clearly defined;
blacks are as determined to gain equality as whites are to
have them remain unequal. The Court has traditionally returned
the problem to the local bodies only to have it resurface in
later cases. Race association in schools has highlighted the
conflict between the majority and minority group because edu-
cation is the primary factor which can be the "social balance
wheel."82 While the Court cannot change racial attitudes or
extend its powers over local school districts under legisla-
tive authority, it can disavow any favoritism toward the status
quo. The interest in black students must be clearly demonstrated
if another century of litigation is to be avoided. Desegrega-
tion requires sacrifices from both races since the policy of
supremacy did harm to whites as well as blacks. It means that
all forms of discrimination aginst blacks--whether through de
facto segregation, unequal financing schemes or the dismantling
of majority black schools--be eliminated in favor of workable
remedies. With the exception of the N.A.A.C.P., black civil
rights advocates no longer require that integration be used as
the only solution to injustice. Black parents in particular
seek the Court's permission to explore any and all educational
devices which give their children equitable results. It is
the duty of the law to grant them that opportunity.
To insure equity blacks must have equal access to educa-
tion; to meet the demand of black enrollment, white schools
must expand, not decrease their minority admissions and black
schools must be improved notdismantled. According to 1971-
1972 statistics on the number of blacks in each profession,
blacks were only 4.5% in medicine, 3.9% in law, 2.1% in en-
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gineering and .8% of all Ph.D. candidates. A proportionate
representation of the 12% minority population demands that the
number of black students in these professions increase substan-
tially. In 1974 one million blacks should have attended col-
lege instead of only one half that number who actually were
enrolled. Adequate representation of blacks in college this
year requires 1.3 million students;84 to meet this demand, black
parents have again turned to the black school.
Kenneth Tollett has isolated several functions of the
black school that can continue to be useful to black educational
interests. First, schools which are controlled and administered
by blacks provide positive role models for black youth. They
learn that they can control their destinies by observing mem-
bers of their race acting in responsible positions and are
motivated to succeed academically and professionally. Second,
black schools are legitimate cultural settings which give psycho-
social comfort to the academic atmosphere. Like Roman Catholics
and Jews, blacks have a valid interest in maintaining schools
which reflect their cultural orientation. The success of Black
Muslim schools is indicative of the positive effect of racial
pride and discipline on pupil performance. Third, the special-
group focus helps blacks, who have suffered from three centuries
of discrimination, make a smooth transition to the "mainstream."
Mario Fantini has pointed out that " . . . it is necessary
for blacks . . . to have a sense of cohesion . . . this can
in part be achieved through control of their own institutions.
. . . once blacks attain a status of potency they will be in
a better position to connect with white society as equals
rather than as 'junior' partners." 85
Fourth, black schools with proper financial backing in-
sure against the current betrayal of black educational interests.
Present judicial decisions condemn ghetto children to poor
schools without the chance of financial assistance or bussing
to wealthier neighborhoods. The Court refuses to uphold pub-
lic school expenditures based on student needs (McGinnis v.
Shapiro, 1968) and does not require equalization of school
funding schemes (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). It has not
overruled de facto segregation and has permitted whites to es-
cape bussing if travel "risked the health of the students or
impinged on education" (Swann v. Mecklenburg, 1971). Recently,
the Court reversed a lower court decision approving the bussing
of black and white students and left the inner city schools
70% black with no adequate financial relief (Bradley v. Milli-
ken, 1973). Rather than face deprivation in a racially iso-
lated school, black parents have tried to gain control of the
black school. In Atlanta.blacks decided to halt desegregation
litigation which threatened to place black children in lower
class white schools and caused wealthier whites to escape to
the suburbs. In exchange, they were given top policy-making
positions on the school board. While the agreement between
local whites and blacks conflicted with the interests of the
national N.A.A.C.P., black parents unanimously demonstrated
their willingness to utilize black schools which they largely
controlled as a way of protecting the educational interests
of their children.
Finally, black schools serve a useful function because
of their support of the disadvantaged black student. Poverty
alone would disqualify many blacks if it were not for the black
school. The average family income in majority white colleges
is $10,000 compared with the average income of $3,900 in black
schools. Of 20,000 black graduates every year, 65% are from
families with incomes below $5,200.86 By serving these students,
the black school has been the only institution to acknowledge
the effect of past discrimination. It has tried to overcome
those deficits and prepare the minority student for equal com-
petition in the society. For these reasons the continued sup-
port of the black schools has been urged.
One must not confuse the reasons for begin-
ning an institution with the reasons for dis-
continuing it. To determine whether an in-
stitution should survive it must be judged
on what it has become. . . . As long as there
is no forced separation, blacks have an inte-
rest in predominantly black schools which
serve the above functions. If desegregation
can be construed to require the consolidation,
merger, or elimination of these schools and
thereby impair the fulfillment of black rights
then it does violence to the spirit, purpose
and meaning of the equal protection clause. 87
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There is no way for America, to make up its debt to blacks
for two centuries of unpaid labor and one century of underpaid
work. The nation built its economic, political and military
strength on the back of black people by maintaining the status
quo and perpetuating racism. The method, not the madness, has
changed over the years. As long as the white public and its
educational and legal institutions avoid discussion of the caste/
class society, it mocks the very principles it holds dear. The
contradiction between practice and theory demands recognition
and begs an appropriate remedy for past and present racist pol-
icies. Epictetus, a former slave writing of ancient Greece said,
"Man has decided that only free men be educated; but God has de-
creed that only the educated shall be truly free."88 If this is
so, then it is the responsibility of America to guarantee min-
orities an opportunity for education defined by the needs of its
students, not by the interests of the majority. Equity demands
that all viable remedies, including the improvement of the black
school, be utilized toward this end. Only by coming to terms with
its hypocrisy and amending the injustice can America fulfill its
promise to every citizen.
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